Government

Everyone in my feed is talking about it: the proposed changes to the SBA size standards.

On August 20, SBA published a proposed rule that rewrites small business size standards across the entire economy (91 FR 53741, RIN 3245-AI67). Comments close September 21. This is the third five-year review required under the Small Business Jobs Act, and SBA did not tinker at the margins. The agency collapsed 978 industry standards and 18 subindustry exceptions into 338 standards set at the 4- and 5-digit NAICS level. They shifted 208 industry groups onto employee-based measures and deleted the maximum size standard entirely (the old ceilings were $47 million in receipts and 1,500 employees). And they added a productivity adjustment on top of inflation for the first time in the program’s history. It also declined to lower any of the standards, including in the 45 industries where SBA’s own analysis said the number should come down.

The proposal moves the small business population from 6,344,967 firms to 6,459,508, a net increase of 114,541. For an administration that claims to want more small businesses, some might see that as a win. But almost nobody is sharing this number 37,002. That’s the number of firms that held contracts in FY2025, that would become newly eligible small businesses. Those firms accounted for 105,655 contracts worth more than $71 billion.

Those are not startups. Those are not new entrants. That is not even new competition, it’s seasoned contractors that get reclassified in a set-aside status.

Looking at where a lot of those companies land is helpful (to me anyway). There are 5,314 Engineering Services firms (541330) with current contracts that become small. 2,247 in Other Computer Related Services (541519). 2,171 firms in Custom Computer Programming (541511), 1,818 firms in Administrative Management and General Management Consulting (541611), and 1,663 firms in Computer Systems Design (541512) are also becoming small. These companies have active CPARS ratings, DCAA-compliant accounting systems, cleared staff, standing GWAC seats, and proposal shops that don’t have to ask what a Section L is. Many of them spent the last decade graduating out of small business status and building the infrastructure to survive without it. Now they walk back through the door carrying it all. Talk about punching above your weight!

SBA’s rule states that growing small businesses closest to the current thresholds will face the greatest competition from newly eligible firms. Those are the companies chasing the same work. If your firm sits at eighty percent of your current standard and your pipeline runs on set-asides, SBA just told you that you to plan on absorbing the impact.

But don’t worry! SBA also offered some reassurance. In one sentence across all 44 pages, SBA says the number of small businesses receiving federal contracts will not be reduced. In other words, the number of small business set-asides isn’t expected to be reduced. The competition for them is just going to go straight up!

Federal agencies obligated more than $883 billion in FY2025 and awarded a record $179 billion in small business prime dollars in FY2024. Unfortunately, widening eligibility does not create new requirements; there are no new appropriated funding dollars, and probably no additional awards. There won’t be additional funds to go to small businesses, just more “small businesses” for existing funds to go to. The requirement counts stay flat while the qualified bidder pool grows by roughly two percent nationally and far more than that inside the professional services codes where most of us live.

But fear not (kind of): The SBA highlighted the upside for contracting officers. The agency calculated that a shorter, simplified rule saves five hours and fifty minutes of reading time. That’s worth a whopping $219.57 per reader at June 2026 average hourly earnings, across roughly 37,600 contracting officers. That level of precision on reading time, in a rule that reshapes the entire small business industrial base, tells you something about which impacts got modeled and which ones got effectively ignored.

What about the defense?

For years, the size protest functioned as a competitive instrument. So did NAICS assignment arguments, and so did the exceptions that were carved out under specific six-digit codes. All three shrink under this proposal. Consolidating to 338 standards eliminates most of the gray area between adjacent codes (SBA uses shipbuilding versus boat building as its own example), and the rule removes every subindustry exception, including the information technology value-added reseller exception that many resellers have built their entire capture posture around. Size protests have already dropped from 500-600 per year in the 2011 to 2016 window down to roughly 300 annually between 2020 and 2024. Fewer standards and no exceptions mean fewer arguments left to make after award.

The conversions cut in both directions, too. If your standard moves from receipts to employees, a lean, high-revenue firm gains room. A staffing-heavy, field-services, or seasonally scaled firm can gain revenue headroom and still trip an employee count it never had to track before. Companies in these situations need to do some modeling of what these impacts would be, now, not during the holiday hiring surge.

This is why, if this rule passes, capture will be even more critical than it has been in the past.

Set-aside eligibility has never been a win strategy. It’s just a filter that determined whose proposal got evaluated. When that filter widens by 114,541 firms and 37,000 of them arrive with real past performance, that filter stops doing any meaningful work for you. What separates winners from participants is everything that happens before the solicitation posts.

Here is what I tell every client. Capture is the discipline of being known, credible, and specifically relevant to a named program office before that office writes the requirement. It’s reading the budget justification and the posture hearing testimony to find out what that customer is actually being held accountable for, then building your value statement against those mission achievement factors instead of your capability list. It’s knowing the incumbent’s weakest CPARS narrative. And it’s having your teaming decisions made before the sources sought hits, not scrambled together in the four days after.

Here are some things you can do in the next 90 days to posture:

• Model your size status under both the current and proposed standards.Pull your consolidated four-digit code, run your trailing five-year receipts and your trailing 24-month average headcount, and find out whether you gain headroom, gain competitors, or both.
• Rebuild your competitive set from SAM.gov and USASpending, not from memory. Filter FY2025 awards in your primary NAICS for firms that were other-than-small and will not be. That list is your new bid board reality.
• Move your effort left of the RFP. Reallocate proposal hours into pre-solicitation engagement, RFI responses that shape language, and industry day conversations where you learn the evaluation logic before it is written down.
• File a comment before September 21.SBA is asking, the docket is open, and the agency responds to specific operational details far better than to general objection. Silence here is a choice.

The set-aside is not going away. It is getting crowded, and crowded markets reward the firms that showed up early and knew the customer by name. If your growth plan for FY2027 depends on being eligible, you do not have a growth plan. You have a registration.

The defense acquisition system has changed more in the past 12 months than it did in the previous 12 years. If you are a government contractor still operating on your 2024 playbook, you are competing in a market that no longer exists.

A year ago, I wrote about President Trump’s Executive Order, “Modernizing Defense Acquisitions and Spurring Innovation in the Defense Industrial Base,” calling it the defense EO the industry had been waiting for. The EOs of 2025 set aggressive timelines for acquisition reform, workforce restructuring, legacy program reviews, regulatory streamlining, and requirements modernization. One year later, nearly every commitment made in those EOs has been acted on. Some have exceeded expectations, but others have created unintended consequences. Several developments not in the original EO have also compounded the pace of change in ways that few companies were prepared for. Here is a look at what the EOs of 2025 look like 1 year after that article.

CSOs and OTAs Are Now the Default

The 2025 defense EO required a plan to be submitted within 60 days to reform DoD’s acquisition processes, with a first preference for commercial solutions and a general preference for OTAs.

Secretary Hegseth’s March 2025 software acquisition memorandum directed all DoD components to use CSOs and OTAs as the default under the Software Acquisition Pathway, and his November 2025 Acquisition Transformation Strategy expanded that direction department-wide. The FY2026 NDAA codified it into statute with section 1823 expanding CSO authority to cover all commercial products and services, not just innovative ones, and authorized follow-on production contracts. Section 1826 exempted nontraditional defense contractors, including all small businesses, from FAR Part 31 cost principles and TINA requirements.

OTAs and CSOs are no longer alternative pathways. They are becoming the default, and an increasing share of new DoD work is flowing through non-FAR channels rather than traditional SAM.gov solicitations. If your BD strategy still starts and ends with SAM.gov keyword searches, you are seeing your share of the available market shrink. I encourage companies to invest the time in understanding how OTAs and CSOs actually work, how pricing differs from FAR-based contracts, and where the legal and protest landscape is still evolving. Companies that understand how to position for and perform under these mechanisms will have a durable competitive advantage. Those that treat them as a niche they can learn later will find that later has already passed.

The Revolutionary FAR Overhaul (RFO)

The most structurally significant development of the past year may not have come from the defense EO at all. Executive Order 14275, “Restoring Common Sense to Federal Procurement,” initiated the Revolutionary FAR Overhaul (RFO), the most comprehensive rewrite of the FAR in over 40 years.

The objective is to strip the FAR of non-statutory rules, rewrite it in plain language, and return it to its statutory roots across the federal government. So far hundreds of pages have already been removed. The DoD followed with 31 DFARS deviations effective February 1, 2026. The ten-for-one deregulation rule is being applied, and the Acquisition Transformation Strategytargets a transition from CAS to GAAP. For those of us who have watched the FAR grow more bloated with each bad procurement outcome over 40 years, this is long overdue.

The opportunity for contractors is real, but class deviations have created uncertainty around which provisions apply to current versus upcoming solicitations. While GSA and OFPP have stripped pages from the FAR, the FY2026 NDAA simultaneously added new mandates. (The executive branch removes rules while Congress adds them.) Contractors need to prepare to educate their government customers on how to engage under the updated guidance and develop new approaches to delivering mission-driven outcomes at speed. Waiting for the dust to settle is not a strategy. The companies that learn the new rules first will shape how the rules are applied.

Workforce Reductions: The Unintended Consequence?

The 2025 defense EO called for a plan to be developed within 120 days to “reform, right-size, and train the acquisition workforce.” The goal was to help acquisition professionals embrace OTAs, CSOs, and the Adaptive Acquisition Framework(AAF). What has actually happened is a broader workforce reduction that hit the acquisition community especially hard.

DOGE-aligned reductions resulted in the loss of over 317,000 federal employees governmentwide by the end of 2025. The DoD targeted a 5% to 8% cut in its civilian workforce of more than 900,000, and the acquisition workforce did not receive a carve-out. DISA reported a 10% staff-reduction, with internal memos warning of “extreme risk for loss of service.” Air Force program executive officers have reported an exodus of senior talent. While the EO envisioned an empowered, risk-taking acquisition workforce, the workforce received buyout offers, hiring freezes, and organizational uncertainty. Contractors should acknowledge this challenge and show extra empathy toward their government customers. They are being asked to do more with less, and there are no signs of relief on the horizon.

Contractors should expect longer timelines from a system that is simultaneously being asked to move faster and implement new processes, with less capacity than ever. I urge companies to be proactive about reducing friction in every government interaction. Submit cleaner proposals, anticipate information requests, and make it easy for an overworked contracting officer to say yes. The companies that treat government capacity constraints as their problem to help solve will move faster than those waiting for the bureaucracy to catch up to the policy.

Program Accountability with Teeth

A 90-day review of all MDAPs, with any program more than 15% over budget or behind schedule, evaluated for potential cancellation, was also required by the 2025 defense EO. That review was completed on schedule.

The January 2026 follow-on EO (E.O. 14372) extended the framework by directly targeting contractor underperformance, including provisions restricting dividends and stock buybacks. The FY2026 NDAA added Section 875, authorizing contracting officers to withhold up to 5% of payments from incumbents who file bid protests, with forfeiture if the protest is dismissed by GAO. Program performance now directly affects future eligibility, and using recompetes as a delay tactic carries real financial risk. For small and mid-size contractors positioning against incumbents, this shift is creating competitive leverage that didn’t exist a year ago. Now is the time to go unseat incumbents.

RIP JCIDS

A review of JCIDS within 180 days of the release of the 2025 defense EO was also mandated. Instead of streamlining JCIDS, the administration killed it. Is anyone mourning the loss of JCIDS?

In August 2025, Secretary Hegseth and Deputy Secretary Feinberg directed the immediate disestablishment of JCIDS and ordered the JROC to stop validating service-level requirements. After 22 years of adding layers to the requirements process, they terminated the system. In its place, the DoD established a problem-focused model built around Key Operational Problems (KOPs), a Requirements and Resourcing Alignment Board (RRAB) that ties requirements directly to funding, and a Mission Engineering and Integration Activity (MEIA) designed to engage industry earlier through experimentation. The 2021 JCIDS instruction mentioned industry once in 118 pages. The nine-page replacement memo mentions industry 15 times. This is a huge win from the industry perspective.

I encourage companies, especially those with mature capabilities in areas identified as KOPs, to shift from responding to requirements to helping shape them. If you are waiting for a solicitation to tell you what the government needs, you are already behind the companies that helped define the problem.

System Transitions Are Reshaping BD Operations

GSA decommissioned FPDS.gov on February 24, 2026 and eSRS four days earlier, consolidating both into SAM.gov. Contract award data searches now require a SAM.gov account through Login.gov. The ATOM feed retires later in FY2026, and CPARS is next. Having experienced the beta.sam.gov transition firsthand, I can tell you these platform shifts always take longer to stabilize than anyone plans for.

The Navy’s SeaPort NxG Portal is scheduled to begin decommissioning by June 30, 2026, with contract actions migrating to ePS and the PIEE Solicitation Module. Effective October 1, 2026, PIEE will be required for unclassified solicitations across DoD. Anyone who has worked within PIEE understands the frustration. I suspect there is a sizable audience that wishes PIEE were on the retirement list as well.

With all the changes happening across the procurement portal landscape, now is the time to reevaluate your BD tool stack. If your competitive intelligence process relies on tools that pull from FPDS or eSRS feeds, confirm with your vendors that they have adapted to SAM.gov and that they also pull from PIEE. Operating with degraded market intelligence is how you miss the opportunity you should have seen coming.

Where It All Stands

The companies gaining traction are tracking where funding sits rather than where attention is focused. They are building fluency in OTA and CSO mechanisms, investing in infrastructure to support 90-day turnarounds (rather than 12-month procurement cycles), engaging across FY26 execution, FY27 congressional shaping, FY28 Pentagon programming, and building relationships with the acquisition workforce that remains. In-person meetings are more important than ever, and relationships are worth more now than they were a year ago. The companies that are winning are getting smart on how to educate their government customers on the new rules. They are comfortable navigating the new norm and helping their government customers do the same. The companies that are successful are getting smart on the best acquisition route for them. They’re educating their government customers and using the new FAR references while doing the groundwork for their customers.

In terms of the major EO commitments, the 60-day acquisition reform plan was implemented through EOs, memos, the Acquisition Transformation Strategy, and the FY2026 NDAA. CSOs and OTAs are now the default, and the DFARS review is underway with 31 deviations in effect. The broader FAR Overhaul is stripping the regulation back to its statutory core. The 90-day MDAP review was completed, and a cancellation list was submitted to OMB. The 120-day workforce plan was submitted, but DOGE-driven reductions have undermined the goals the EO articulated.

The 180-day JCIDS review resulted in the complete elimination of the system. Although the transitions of FPDS, eSRS, SeaPort NxG, and eventually CPARS were not part of the original EO, they are still reshaping the operational environment in parallel.

THe changes that we’ve seen are not about the policy or the legislation. They’re not even about the politics behind the pen. These changes impact the entire acquisition framework, from how requirements are defined to how contracts are competed, how performance is evaluated, and how data is accessed. Not to mention how the workforce that manages all of it. The defense demand signal is still strong, and the structural barriers to entry are lower than they have been in a long time. The rules are being rewritten in favor of companies that can deliver outcomes at speed, but none of that matters if you are still operating on last year’s playbook.

No, The Grass Isn’t Greener in Other GovCon BD Shops

There’s a persistent belief in government contracting that somewhere out there is a perfectly functioning business development organization. A shop with a clean pipeline, airtight capture discipline, flawless win rates, and complete executive alignment. When revenue dips or bids are lost, it’s easy to assume the problem is internal and that other companies must have figured it out. Let me dispel the myth. Other companies have not figured it out.

After years of working with various organizations, including small businesses, mid-tier contractors, larger integrators, academic institutions, and government agencies, I’ve observed a consistent pattern. Every organization tends to believe that its business development (BD) challenges are unique, and many present an inaccurate portrayal of their BD teams. In reality, most organizations face similar structural challenges, albeit presented in different ways.

One common myth that I frequently encounter is the belief that increasing volume can solve growth problems. This is simply not true. The “spray and pray” approach, which involves submitting more Requests for Information (RFIs) and proposals, and entering more Indefinite Delivery/Indefinite Quantity (IDIQ) contracts, generates activity but lacks a defined strategy. Federal agencies do not award contracts based on enthusiasm or the number of submissions. They award contracts based on factors such as relevant past performance, a clear understanding of the mission, the advantage of incumbency, familiarity with the customer, and credible technical expertise. When companies pursue every opportunity that seems “close enough,” they dilute their positioning, stretch their capture resources, and exhaust their proposal teams. Submitting more bids does not necessarily lead to more wins; in fact, it often results in more losses. (See my recent article on Shiny Object Syndrome – SOS for more on this).

The second myth is that having a mature process alone guarantees success. Many companies respond to inconsistent results by establishing increasingly rigid capture frameworks. If you can’t figure out why you lost a recent proposal, I can assure you that adding a fourteenth-stage gate, increasing the amount of mandatory documentation, and/or requiring executive approval for every action in the CRM won’t help. While this approach may seem disciplined on paper, the reality is that federal contracting is way more dynamic. Funding can shift, requirements can merge or change, and policy changes can significantly alter priorities before ever being announced. Acquisition strategies can (and often do) evolve unexpectedly during the opportunity lifecycle. And the government isn’t known for being the best at updating that information in real time.  If your capture process is unable to adapt to these realities, it becomes an exercise in performative compliance (compliance theater, perhaps) rather than strategic enablement. While discipline is important, excessive rigidity is not; it will inevitably become a burden even for the best teams.

Another uncomfortable truth is that most BD shops are far less institutional than they appear from the outside or advertise. Big companies still struggle to rein in their processes, and corporate knowledge is often trapped in individuals rather than embedded in systems. When a senior capture lead leaves, the context they created leaves with them. This prompts the next person to question why a similar opportunity was passed on, what competitive intelligence influenced prior pricing, and which discriminator resonated in the last industry engagement. CRM entries (should) capture data, but they don’t capture judgment or personal decision-making processes. Many organizations are still patching together institutional memory through email chains, slide decks, and verbal history. The perception of a polished growth engine often masks fragile knowledge-retention processes. Think about this next time you walk into a conversation with a legacy prime expecting it to be a top-tier organizational capture/BD  process shop.

Perhaps the most pervasive issue, however, is structural misalignment around responsibility. In many organizations, BD is treated as singularly accountable for revenue growth. Pipeline thin? That’s a BD problem. Win rate down? Another BD problem. Recompete lost? Clearly, BD should have positioned better. This perspective blatantly ignores reality. BD can’t operate in isolation, nor should it. The BD team can’t invent strong past performance if delivery falters (never mind that many do, especially with the rise of AI tools that smooth over rough edges and hallucinate). BD can’t craft credible solutions without technical subject matter experts engaging early (no, asking them to plug information into ChatGPT and hope for the best output doesn’t count as subject matter expertise). BD can’t correct misaligned pricing strategies without input from the finance discipline. BD can’t build authentic customer intimacy while SMEs remain billable and absent from engagement.

Federal growth is an enterprise function. It requires coordinated behavior across leadership, technical teams, operations, finance, and contracts. When that coordination is weak, outcomes suffer. Assigning full responsibility to BD may simplify internal narratives, but it does not solve the underlying problem.

The belief that “another company has it figured out” often reflects internal frustration more than external reality. Every BD shop has dysfunction. Some chase too much. Some overanalyze and miss windows. Some obsess over process. Some operate reactively. Some hoard institutional knowledge. Some pretend their CRM is a strategy. The dysfunction varies, but it exists everywhere.

The federal market itself compounds the challenge. Acquisition cycles are long and uncertain. Funding profiles shift with appropriations and continuing resolutions. Executive Orders and policy reforms can redirect agency priorities within months. Workforce reductions affect procurement timelines and oversight capacity. Vehicles consolidate, increasing competition density. Compliance burdens expand. In that environment, no BD organization operates under stable, predictable conditions.

The companies that consistently win are not those with mythical perfection. They are those with alignment. They focus on defined agencies rather than everything everywhere. They make deliberate bid/no-bid decisions. They involve technical leadership early and visibly. They document lessons learned beyond superficial checklists. They distribute ownership of growth across the enterprise rather than concentrating it in one department.

The grass is not greener in other BD shops. It is simply managed differently.

For executives, the takeaway is straightforward: growth is not a department. It is a culture supported by process, accountability, and cross-functional engagement. Hiring a stronger BD lead will not compensate for weak delivery, absent technical participation, or unfocused strategy. Sustainable growth requires enterprise discipline.

Until organizations internalize that reality, BD professionals will continue to look over the fence, convinced that someone somewhere else has solved the equation. They will move, only to discover that the challenges look and feel remarkably familiar.

Do you suffer from relentless thoughts of FOMO?

Have you been doom-scrolling sam.gov regularly?

Does your ideal client profile shift week to week, or even day to day?

Does your gut instinct drive organizational trajectory, or is your BD process documentation stored in an outdated folder somewhere in the org’s ether?

If you experience any of these symptoms, you might be suffering from Shiny Object Syndrome (SOS).

SOS is a pervasive challenge that can impact everyone in an organization, but it most often surfaces among enthusiastic executives and business development (BD) staff who lack a clear strategic direction. When organizations allow impulsive pursuit decisions to override well-defined strategy, resources are quickly spread too thin, top talent becomes exhausted, and the company’s contract portfolio loses cohesion and value. Instead of building a strong pipeline focused on opportunities that support long-term goals, teams end up chasing a series of unrelated projects that ultimately weaken overall performance and growth potential.

It’s tempting to think, “If there’s a chance we can win it, why not go after any opportunity even loosely connected to what we do?” or “Our main objective is to generate revenue, so any successful pursuit means we’re meeting our goals.” However, these assumptions can be incredibly risky. The cognitive biases and internal conflict that come with SOS can ultimately erode the strength and reputation of even the most established firms. This kind of thinking doesn’t just lead to internal confusion, it sends mixed signals to your employees and, more importantly, your customers. When customers observe your company chasing diverse, unrelated projects, they may lose confidence in your focus and question your commitment to meeting their specific needs. While SOS might occasionally yield unexpected wins and a more varied contract portfolio, the downsides are far greater: wasted resources, lost customers, disengaged employees, and a diluted brand identity. If your pipeline starts to resemble a patchwork of unrelated agencies and opportunities rather than a clear strategic direction, consider it a warning sign. It may be time to pause, reassess, and seek help to restore focus and discipline.

SOS is particularly prevalent among federal executives, those visionary leaders who bring infectious enthusiasm to the table but can unintentionally disrupt the team’s focus. Much like a puppy captivated and enthralled by a new toy, their excitement can be both inspiring and overwhelming. These executives often burst into capture meetings with fresh ideas, asking questions like, “Why didn’t we go after that opportunity?” or declaring, “We could definitely do that work…let’s pursue it!” However, since they’re not usually involved in the daily grind of capture activities, they often overlook the significant planning, effort, and resources required to pursue each opportunity. This disconnect puts pressure on business development teams to stray from carefully crafted strategies in order to satisfy leadership’s fleeting interests. Even the most disciplined BD teams may feel compelled to chase projects for which they are not well-positioned, simply to align with executive enthusiasm. The result is a pipeline that quickly becomes cluttered and unfocused, filled with a patchwork of random pursuits that rarely advance to completion.

In the best-case scenario, a pursuit is terminated in the later capture phases when “new” information is uncovered that clearly precludes the company from success. This could involve discovering competitive pricing strategies that are impossible to match, realizing an incumbent has a strong hold on the contract, or learning that the agency’s priorities have shifted away from your core offerings. Recognizing these factors early and making the decision to step away demonstrates strategic maturity and strong leadership. Rather than seeing termination as a failure, it should be viewed as a proactive step to protect the organization’s resources and reputation. By ending a pursuit before significant bid and proposal (B&P) costs accumulate, you not only preserve budget but also prevent your team from wasting time and energy chasing contracts with little chance of success. This level of discipline helps your organization focus on opportunities that truly align with your strengths and long-term goals, ultimately strengthening your contract portfolio and positioning your company for sustainable growth. Making the tough call to terminate a pursuit is never easy, but it’s a critical move that safeguards your team from the pitfalls of Shiny Object Syndrome and keeps your business development strategy purposeful and effective.

Without the discipline and rigor necessary to maintain a robust capture and business development (BD) organization, companies inevitably find themselves grasping at every potential opportunity, often in a frantic, last-minute fashion. This reactive approach leads to a BD team that is constantly scrambling, essentially sending out a distress signal (an SOS) to halt the chaos and confusion caused by Shiny Object Syndrome. Rather than following a strategic path, these teams chase after any contract that appears on the horizon, regardless of whether it truly aligns with the company’s strengths or long-term goals.

This cycle of disorganization and impulsivity is not sustainable. Government contracting is not about chasing quick wins or taking every chance that comes along. Being successful in government contracting demands thoughtful, focused leadership with a clear sense of direction. Success in this market comes from careful planning, deliberate decision-making, and a commitment to pursuing only those opportunities that are well-matched to the organization’s capabilities and strategic vision. When leadership prioritizes discipline and structure in BD processes, such as maintaining up-to-date documentation, establishing clear qualification criteria, and regularly reviewing the pipeline, teams can avoid the pitfalls of SOS. Instead of ending up overwhelmed and distressed, a company guided by strong leadership is positioned for sustainable growth, a healthier contract portfolio, and a more motivated, confident BD team.

Is your BD team sending out an SOS? If you find your strategy shifting from day to day, week to week, or even month to month, it’s a strong indicator that your organization may be suffering from SOS. This condition leads teams to chase after every new opportunity, regardless of whether it aligns with the company’s strengths or long-term objectives, just to satisfy those “extra hangry” executives. While some BD teams become adept at navigating the resulting turbulence, even the most skilled professionals can struggle to maintain focus and keep pursuits aligned when the underlying strategy is in constant flux.

The true remedy for SOS goes beyond simply working harder or adapting to chaos. It requires a deliberate commitment to introspection and honest reflection about what your company does best and where it wants to go. Establishing strong task management practices and implementing structured, repeatable BD processes are essential steps. This might include developing and adhering to a clearly defined ideal client profile, maintaining up-to-date pursuit documentation, and regularly evaluating your pipeline for alignment with strategic goals. Consistency is key—when discipline and rigor guide the BD process, teams are empowered to say no to distractions and focus their energy on opportunities that truly advance the company’s mission.

Ultimately, overcoming SOS is about creating a culture where thoughtful leadership and strategic planning are prioritized over chasing every shiny new prospect. By investing in the right systems and fostering consistency, your BD team can escape the chaos, protect valuable resources, and position your organization for sustainable growth and long-term success.

The longer I’ve worked in the federal contracting ecosystem, the more tribes I’ve come into contact with. And the more tribes I’ve come into contact with, the clearer the differences between them have become. Just as the remote tribes of Siberia are vastly different from those in Papua New Guinea, despite both being labeled “remote,” the tribes that exist within the federal government are equally distinct. They wear different uniforms. They speak different languages. They value different things. They pass down institutional knowledge in different ways. 

Tribes do not just exist within the federal ecosystem. In many ways, they define it. 

If you’ve ever worked with the military or served yourself, you already know the unspoken rule: do not walk into an Air Force office speaking Army. Some people joke you will be laughed out of the room. More realistically, you will struggle to follow the conversation and miss the signals you are supposed to catch. Acronyms will not line up. Priorities will not be framed the way you expect. The room will subtly tell you that you do not belong there yet. 

Those inter-service differences are real, but the contrast between DoD and civilian agencies is even more pronounced. It is not just a different branch of the same tree. It is a different ecosystem entirely. Each agency has its own way of defining urgency, risk, and success. Even when agencies are pursuing similar missions or procuring similar capabilities, the way they describe the problem and the acceptable path to a solution can look completely different. 

Language is often where this divergence shows up first. 

Different agencies routinely use different terms to describe the same thing. Sometimes the differences are subtle. Other times, they are foundational. What one organization calls a program, another calls a project. What one refers to as a requirement, another frames as an objective or a capability gap. In some agencies, a concept of operations is central. In others, it barely exists. The words change, the artifacts change, and the expectations tied to those words change as well. 

If you are not attuned to those distinctions, it is easy to believe you are aligned when you are not. You may be answering the question you think was asked, while your customer believes they asked something entirely different. 

If you approach an organization without some level of familiarity with these nuances, one thing is almost guaranteed, you will be viewed as foreign. And tribes, historically speaking, do not always welcome outsiders with open arms. 

That said, I do not believe success in federal contracting requires choosing a single tribe and staying there forever. Limiting yourself to one organization or one way of doing business can be just as risky as trying to pursue everything indiscriminately. Agencies reorganize. Budgets shift. Missions evolve. A tribe that is well funded and receptive today may look very different in two years. 

The most successful companies and practitioners I have seen are not loyal to a single tribe. They are fluent in several. The difference is intention. 

Working across tribes requires deliberate effort. It requires learning how each organization frames problems, how decisions are actually made, and what signals matter versus which ones are just noise. It also requires recognizing when two agencies are talking about the same thing using different words, and when they are using the same words to mean different things entirely. 

Another defining characteristic of federal tribes is how knowledge is passed down and how fragile that process often is. 

Most federal organizations struggle with institutional memory, but the drivers of that challenge differ across communities. In the military, permanent change of station moves are a fact of life. People rotate out of roles on a predictable cadence, often every two to three years. In civilian agencies, the churn looks different, but the outcome is the same. Promotions, reassignments, retirements, reorganizations, and lateral moves all contribute to frequent turnover. Two years in one seat is often considered a long tenure. 

The result is an environment where tribal knowledge is passed informally, inconsistently, and sometimes not at all. Processes exist because “that is how it has always been done,” even when no one in the room can explain why. Decisions are revisited. Lessons are relearned. Context is lost. 

For outsiders, this can feel chaotic or contradictory. For insiders, it can be exhausting. But for tribes, it is simply reality, and it heavily influences how new people and new ideas are received. Trust is not built quickly because continuity is not guaranteed. 

This dynamic is not unique to government. From an organizational perspective, it is incredibly common. In the commercial world, brands like Patagonia, REI, Cotopaxi, and Fjällräven attract customers who value sustainability, environmental responsibility, and long-term durability. Fast fashion brands attract a different audience, one that prioritizes price, speed, and volume. Neither model is inherently right or wrong, but they are fundamentally incompatible. 

If you walk into REI expecting fast fashion, you are going to leave disappointed. Not because REI is doing anything wrong, but because you do not share the tribe’s values or buying expectations. REI shoppers generally value craftsmanship, sourcing, and longevity. Fast fashion buyers optimize for turnover and cost. 

That same dynamic plays out across the federal landscape. 

There are periods when the government behaves like a fast fashion buyer. Think of the heyday of Lowest Price Technically Acceptable contracting, when compliance and cost dominated nearly every acquisition decision. There are other periods when cost-plus or more flexible acquisition models gain favor, often accompanied by heightened scrutiny and political attention. Administrations change. Missions change. The prevailing philosophy of buying shifts accordingly. 

You cannot make everyone happy. But if you do not understand who you are selling to and how they define value in that moment, you will constantly feel misaligned, even when your solution is sound. 

Different federal organizations buy in different ways, from different vendors, using different vehicles. Some agencies rely heavily on internal contract vehicles and expect industry to adapt. Others prefer governmentwide solutions. Some are comfortable experimenting with newer acquisition authorities. Others are deeply risk-averse. Even when agencies are buying functionally similar services, the acceptable path to award can vary dramatically. 

The same applies to everyday language. 

What does “CO” mean in the room you are in? Is it Contracting Officer, Commanding Officer, or Change Order?
What does “CSP” signal to your customer? Commercial Sales Practices, Cloud Service Provider, or Credential Service Provider?
What about “PO”? Program Office, Project Order, Purchase Order, or Period of Performance? 

ATO? Is that Authority to Operate or Air Tasking Order? Do you call the restroom the head or the latrine? Is a bed a rack or a bunk? These are just a couple of examples, and they’re not academic distinctions. Misunderstanding them can derail conversations, create false alignment, or quietly undermine credibility. In many cases, two agencies may describe the same role or process using entirely different terms, assuming everyone present understands the context. 

It is easy to become fluent in one agency’s language. It is much harder to remain fluent across multiple tribes without constantly checking your assumptions. That effort is not optional if you intend to work broadly across the federal landscape. 

Even the places where people gather and exchange ideas differ significantly across the federal ecosystem. Some communities gravitate toward informal, invite-only digital spaces like Signal chats or Chatham House–style forums. Others cluster around nonprofit and practitioner-led organizations, such as Defense Entrepreneurs Forum (www.DEF.org)  and its local “Agora” model, which emphasize in-person dialogue and peer learning for defense-focused entrepreneurs. You might consider a more focused industry association like @AUSA (www.AUSA.org), Navy League (www.navyleague.org), or something even more niche like @GovCon Queens (www.govconqueens.com).  Still others remain firmly anchored in government-provided environments, both virtual and in person. 

GSA offers platforms such as Interact (https://buy.gsa.gov/interact/)  for structured engagement with industry and government. Some agencies prefer formal industry days, while others convene conversations off-site through innovation hubs and WERX-style organizations. These gathering places are not interchangeable. They reflect how each tribe prefers to communicate, share information, and manage risk. 

If you do not know where your tribe gathers, you will struggle to engage them in a low-friction, low-risk way. Effective engagement starts by meeting people where they already are, not by expecting them to show up on your terms. 

All of these aspects are why I often liken federal organizations to remote tribes worldwide. Not because they are inaccessible, but because they demand an approach with respect, preparation, and humility. You would not walk into a remote village without learning something about its customs, values, and social structure first. Doing so wouldn’t make you bold. It would make you careless. The same applies in federal contracting. 

If you want to work effectively in federal contracting, you do not need to pledge allegiance to a single tribe. You do, however, need to invest the time to understand the tribes you are choosing to engage with. That includes the language they use to describe familiar concepts, the way they pass down knowledge despite constant turnover, and the signals they use to determine who belongs. 

In this ecosystem, success is not about narrowing your world.
It is about expanding your fluency and finding your tribe(s).  

2025 didn’t fix defense acquisition, but it certainly changed the direction.

2025 is the year everything changed for me. I got married. I became a parent. And
somewhere in between learning how to function on very little sleep and recalibrating what
really matters, I watched the defense acquisition system start to change in ways I honestly
wasn’t sure I would ever see.

Those major personal milestones have a way of sharpening perspective. For me, I stopped
tolerating vague timelines. I stopped accepting “eventually” as an answer. I care a lot more
now about whether systems actually work, whether decisions get made on time, and
whether outcomes match intent. That lens has significantly shaped how I’ve watched
acquisition reform unfold this year.

Anyone who has spent real time in defense acquisition knows the problems I’m about to
discuss. The system has been slow, fragmented, and ineffective for a long time.
Requirements haven’t kept pace with the threat. Programs have been built in isolation and
magically expected to interoperate later. Integration has dragged on for years, all while
costs balloon and schedules slip. Good technology continuously dies in the valley of death
because funding decisions and procurement timelines never quite align. Meanwhile,
warfighters and allies wait WAY too long for capabilities we already know how to deliver.
None of this has been hidden or done in the shadows. These issues became an embedded
part of the acquisition culture. We have collectively lived with them, complained about
them, and learned how to work with and around them. But in my opinion, 2025 felt
different. Not because the problems changed, but because the response to them finally
seems to have.

In 2025, the Department of War (DoW) and national security leadership seemed to stop
pretending that the old system could be patched, tuned, or optimized. They started taking it
apart and dismantling the old infrastructure. That alone is why this acquisition reform effort
feels fundamentally different from the ones we’ve seen before.

The National Defense Strategy (NDS) made that message clear. The current (old)
acquisition system simply can’t deliver what the strategy demands. Congress and the
administration followed up with a slate of reforms throughout 2025 and solidified them in
the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for 2026. The EOs, directives, and
legislation issued in 2025 explicitly support portfolio management, requirements reform,
engineering integration, and new funding mechanisms. These efforts seem to be a real
departure from the incremental tweaks to legacy processes we’ve all grown used to.

Take, for example, the shift from Program Executive Offices (PEOs) to Portfolio Acquisition
Executives (PAEs). Anyone who has worked in or around a PEO understands how
entrenched that model has become. It has delivered results, but they’re usually siloed and
not widely replicated. The new portfolio model for PAEs pushes leaders to consider
integrated mission outcomes rather than protecting individual programs. With the PAE
model, design, integration, engineering, and funding are tied to the mission rather than to
the org chart. In an ecosystem where org charts seem to change constantly, this is a long
needed, structural shift that should have happened years ago. Now the 2026 NDAA
formally locks it in.

The same is true for requirements reform. The Joint Capabilities Integration and
Development System (JCIDS) has been a bottleneck for as long as most contractors can
remember. It was built in (and for) a different era, and it has slowed decision-making for
decades. The 2026 NDAA officially removes it as the governing construct and replaces it
with mechanisms that are focused on identifying Key Operational Problems (KOPs). Those
problems will be ranked and pushed into funded action through the Requirements and
Resourcing Alignment Board (RRAB). This is the first time that senior leaders will have a
formal way to say, “These are the problems that matter, and this is where the money needs
to go.” That alignment has been missing for a long time.

The Joint Acceleration Reserve (JAR) is another practical step forward to addressing one of
the biggest acquisition challenges faced by small companies with innovative solutions –
The valley of death. The valley of death didn’t come about by accident. In fact, it’s been a
predictable outcome of the budget process for a long time. Until now, there hasn’t been a
mechanism to fund solutions as soon as they’re ready to be fielded. The JAR is meant to
change that dynamic and give the Department a way to move when capability is actually
available.

The Mission Engineering Integration Activity (MEIA) tackles another long-standing issue.
Integration has too often been treated as a cleanup effort at the end of procurement and
production. The MEIA should push shared engineering foundations, common data models,
and earlier industry engagement to the front, where integration belongs. This is the fix that
years of “we’ll integrate it later” policies never delivered on.

One of the most significant changes we saw in 2025 was the administration’s undertaking
of the “legendary” Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) Overhaul. For decades, the FAR has
grown through constant accumulation. More clauses, more exceptions, more compliance
layered on top of compliance. Everyone inside the system felt the drag, even if they
disagreed on how to fix it. In 2025, the decision to address the problems with the FAR truly
signaled something important: that this acquisition reform isn’t about adding another
workaround or pilot. It’s about simplifying how the government buys, removing
requirements that no longer serve a clear purpose, and giving contracting officers more
room to exercise judgment rather than defaulting to box-checking. The overhaul is still
underway and FAR from finished, but it’s a critical complement to portfolio management
and requirements reform. If the broader reforms are about what the government buys and
why, the FAR overhaul is about how it actually happens day-to-day.

Even with all of that said, not everything survived the legislative processes and
negotiations.

Several proposed reforms that would have strengthened pricing transparency and oversight
were stripped from the final 2026 NDAA. Early House and Senate versions included
provisions to limit outdated cost and pricing data and close loopholes that allow prices to
be justified after the fact, but those didn’t make the final cut. Instead, Congress asked the
Department to study the issue and report back, a much softer outcome than many pricing
reformers hoped for.

The same thing happened with oversight of Other Transaction Authority (OTAs) agreements.
Proposed guardrails were replaced with a much more basic approach – a Government
Accountability Office (GAO) review. Supporters of flexibility argue that the Other
Transaction Authority should remain light touch. Critics of the outcome argue that the lack
of oversight invites abuse. That debate still remains unresolved.

Perhaps most surprising was the elimination of right-to-repair provisions. Even bipartisan
reforms wanted to give service members the right to repair their own equipment. However,
those inclusions were stripped after industry members pushed back. (I think we know who
wants to keep the rights to repair their own systems, at a greater cost to the government….
Looking at you, big primes!) Those provisions had broad support and still didn’t survive. It’s
hard not to see that as a reminder of how much influence traditional primes continue to
have over maintenance and sustainment.

Taken together, the omissions highlight a tension running through the 2025 reform efforts.
On one hand, the 2026 NDAA codifies real change. On the other hand, there is a distinct
avoidance of some of the most challenging fights over issues such as transparency,
oversight, and incentives. That tension leaves many people unsure about what’s going to
come. Some are wondering if we are truly entering a new era of capability delivery, while
others wonder if we’re rebranding parts of the same system and hoping for better results.
For the workforce, the message is mixed. Authority is shifting, and expectations are
increasing. Portfolio thinking and engineering discipline are clearly on the rise, but the lack
of hard constraints on cost and oversight leaves room for old habits to creep back in.
Industry is getting the same mixed signals. Companies are being told to build modular,
interoperable, exportable solutions that fit into portfolios. At the same time, many of the
old pricing and data practices remain untouched. These disconnects could slow real
competition.

There’s no question that 2025 marked the most significant acquisition reform effort in a
generation. And on a personal level, it was a year that reshaped how I think about time,
urgency, and follow-through. Both professionally and personally, this year reinforced the
same lesson for me. Real change doesn’t come from talking about it. It comes from doing
the work to drive change and continuing to confront and execute on the harder work that
follows.

For me, the reforms that passed in 2025 show what’s possible, and the ones that didn’t
show how much work really remains. What happens next will matter far more than what
was announced this year.

In 2026, I’m watching closely to see the follow-through from what was started in 2025.